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A B S T R A C T
Shale development – extraction of oil and gas from shale rock formations using hydraulic fracturing or
‘fracking’ – has become a critical focus for energy debates in the US and UK. In both countries, potential
industry expansion into new areas for shale extraction is expected to produce a wide range of
environmental and social impacts and to change the conﬁguration of future energy systems. To engage
with emergent views on these complex, multi-scale issues, we held a series of day-long deliberation
workshops (two in the US and two in the UK) designed and facilitated for diverse groups of people to
discuss a range of possible consequences and meanings of shale development. Amid nuanced differences
between and within national contexts, notable similarities in views were tracked across all four
workshops. Concerns in common were not limited to speciﬁc risks such as water contamination.
Participants also questioned whether shale development was compatible with their visions for and
concerns about the longer-term future – including views on impacts and causes of climate change,
societal dependency on fossil fuels, development of alternative energy technologies, the perceived short-
term objectives of government and industry agencies, and obligations to act responsibly toward future
generations. Extending prior qualitative research on shale development and on energy systems change,
this research brings open-ended and cross-national public deliberation inquiry to bear on broader issues
of climate change, responsibility, and ideas about how shale development might undermine or reinforce
the energy systems that people consider important for the future.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Fossil fuel extraction from shale rock using processes of
hydraulic fracturing (or ‘fracking’) has increased signiﬁcantly in
recent years. This has created a range of measurable impacts at
local, regional, national and global levels (Willow, 2014). The US
has become the world’s largest producer of oil and gas (EIA, 2015),
and governments elsewhere, including the UK, support shale
development within their energy policies. Widespread changes
that shale development introduces affect energy systems, deﬁned
as the material and social infrastructures involved in energy
generation, distribution and consumption. Since energy systems* Corresponding author.
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(B.H. Harthorn).
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agriculture as well as with ecosystems, shale development also has
consequences for global climate change (Levi, 2013). Energy
systems underpin many technological arrangements, forms of
social organization, and environmental practices in industrial
economies (Miller et al., 2013) and so the actual and potential
changes introduced by shale development are wide-ranging, as are
public responses to them.
Surveys have broadly gauged changing levels of public support
for and opposition to shale development in both the US (Clarke
et al., 2012) and UK (O’Hara et al., 2014). However, these studies
have not yet fully explored the concerns, values and imagined
futures that inﬂuence views on shale development and energy
systems more broadly (Demski et al., 2015). Addressing such gaps,
the research presented here is based on a series of public
deliberation workshops held in the US and UK – designed and
facilitated for diverse groups of people to learn about and explorele under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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consequences and meanings of shale development that go beyond
the tangible health, economic and environmental effects
addressed in survey research. Much previous public participation
research on environmental decision making has focused on local
issues (Dietz, 2013), but climate change and energy system change
operate across multiple temporal and geospatial scales and have
similarly wide-ranging effects on social, economic and environ-
mental relations (Ostrom, 2010; Jasanoff and Kim, 2013; Pidgeon
et al., 2014). Through multi-sited, deliberative research we bring
public deliberation techniques and inquiry with their special
capacity to illuminate emergent views to bear on diverse views on
these complex, multi-scale issues in locations with distinct
histories, priorities and socioecological conditions.
The US and UK share important similarities and differences that
contextualize this research. Miller et al. (2013) argue the broader
social consequences of energy system change have been system-
atically underemphasized in US energy debates, including in
reports from the Department of Energy (DOE, 2011) and the
National Academies on America’s Energy Future (e.g. NRC, 2008;
NAS, 2009). Similar observations have been made of UK energy
debates (Butler et al., 2013). Both countries have also historically
shared comparable degrees of dependency on fossil fuels for
electricity generation (DECC, 2016; EIA, 2016) and today face
similar pressures to develop shale oil and gas reserves (Thomas
et al., 2016). However, shale extraction in some US states is an
established industry, while in the UK it is still at an exploratory
stage (Hawkins, 2015). We suggest these variations make shale
development a “liminal” case for deliberation and discuss the
implications this has for deliberative research. Further critical
differences between the two countries in science values (Gaskell
et al., 2005), attitudes toward precaution about risks, climate
change beliefs (Capstick et al., 2015), deliberative processes and
risk controversy histories (Jasanoff, 2005; Pidgeon et al., 2009)
provide a compelling basis for studying public deliberation across
these different contexts.
Shale development has become an important case in which
critical US and UK energy debates are played out, and scholars in
both countries have identiﬁed the need for analyses of the social
context and impacts of energy system change (Hess, 2013; Laird,
2013; Parkhill et al., 2013a; Pidgeon et al., 2014). Such analyses
require research that considers shale development in national and
global contexts without restricting focus to speciﬁc locations and
localized impacts – as has been the focus of much qualitative work
in the US (Thomas et al., 2016). In this paper, we ask how people in
small public deliberation groups across multiple US and UK
locations form or reﬁne views on shale development and
associated near- and long-term impacts when considered as part
of larger energy systems. We examine these emergent views in the
context of broader discussions on: tensions between immediate
interests versus longer-term concerns (Groves, 2014); dependency
on fossil fuels (Demski et al., 2015); and questions about individual,
collective, industry, and governmental responsibilities for chang-
ing energy systems to address long-term societal needs (Leiss and
Powell, 2004; Lorenzoni and Hulme, 2009). Our analysis thus
extends the focus of qualitative research on shale development
from speciﬁc perceived risks and beneﬁts to broader issues of
responsibility, climate change, and energy-society relations.
2. Background
2.1. Shale development
Shale oil and gas are referred to as unconventional fossil fuels
because they are located in low-permeability source rock and thus
cannot be extracted using methods that drill directly intoconventional subsurface resource reservoirs (Stern et al., 2014).
Instead, extraction from shale requires a combination of additional
technologies, some new and some repurposed. These include high-
volume, high-pressure hydraulic fracturing in which ﬂuid and ﬁne-
grain sand are injected to open ﬁssures in the shale in order to
access the oil and gas it contains (CCST, 2015). Other technological
advancements that have facilitated the expansion of shale
development, particularly in the US, include the ability to drill
horizontally for distances of up to two miles and seismic imaging of
deeper subsurface areas (Maugeri, 2013). Government investment
and ﬂuctuations in global resource markets have played key roles
in enabling these developments (Trembath et al., 2012). At the
same time, concerns are emerging regarding the social and
environmental consequences of extracting these previously
inaccessible and relatively abundant fossil fuels (Hughes, 2013;
Davis and Fisk, 2014), raising critical issues related to economic
growth (including job creation), environmental impacts (such as
water contamination), climate change and energy systems (Boudet
et al., 2013; Demski et al., 2015).
The processes and technologies associated with shale gas and
oil extraction by hydraulic fracturing which here we refer to as
“shale development” are more commonly identiﬁed in public and
political spheres as “fracking.” We note that no single term is
sufﬁcient to capture all associated phenomena (Evensen et al.,
2014) and that in US survey research “fracking” has been linked
more to negative associations than “shale gas development”
(Clarke et al., 2015). In contrast to such survey research, however,
our deliberative conversations principally addressed in detail
many aspects of “shale oil and gas extraction,” from the formation
of unconventional shale resources and some of the technical
procedures involved in their extraction, to the range of associated
social and environmental impacts. During these conversations,
“fracking” would sometimes emerge as a shorthand term used by
both participants and researchers. In the workshop protocol,
however, we explicitly used “shale gas and oil extraction” as the
primary focus for our discussions and informational materials, and
our pre- and post-survey questions consistently used the phrase
“hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’),” partly in response to our expert
reviewers’ expressed pReferences
2.2. Public views on shale development
Research to date demonstrates that public views on shale
development vary signiﬁcantly both within the US and elsewhere
(Graham et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2016). Nationally, US surveys
have found widespread unfamiliarity and uncertainty about
whether to support or oppose it (Clarke et al., 2012; Boudet
et al., 2013; Borick and Clarke, 2016), changing to greater
awareness and more emphatic views, both for and against, in
areas where shale development is underway (Lachapelle and
Montpetit, 2014; Kromer, 2015). In states such as Pennsylvania that
have seen signiﬁcant shale extraction operations, studies have
found social conﬂict amid polarized views on local drilling (Schafft
et al., 2013; Jerolmack and Berman, 2016). In other areas, often
those marked by prolonged rural poverty (Simonelli, 2014), ‘pro
natural gas’ activism linked to the economic beneﬁts of shale
extraction has emerged in direct conﬂict with proposed state-wide
bans in New York (Colosi, 2015). In addition to factors such as
proximity, familiarity, and socio-economic status, studies have
identiﬁed views on shale development are also inﬂuenced by
political ideology, environmental values, gender, worldviews and
media use (Boudet et al., 2013). Meanwhile, UK polls have found
ﬂuctuating levels of support and opposition, inﬂuenced both by US
experiences (Mazur, 2014) and high-proﬁle protest events (O’Hara
et al., 2013, 2014). The best summary appears to be that social and
ecological impacts of shale development are contested, and public
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et al., 2015).
Qualitative studies on societal responses to shale development
have tended to focus on directly affected communities and on how
governments have framed the issues. Recent UK-based deliberative
research on prospective shale development has highlighted public
mistrust of decision-making processes (TNS BMRB, 2014) and the
misalignment of dominant institutional framings which focus on
safety and feasibility, with those adopted by UK publics which
emphasize precaution (Williams et al., 2015). US-based focus
groups research located in areas near intensive shale development
has identiﬁed concerns about the longevity of extractive oper-
ations with a focus on community change, effects on agriculture,
and localized health and environmental impacts (Schafft et al.,
2013; Brasier et al., 2014). Many US and UK government and
industry representatives have interpreted public concern as a lack
of understanding about such documented impacts and risks – a
stance that these studies criticize (Israel et al., 2015; Williams et al.,
2015). However, following energy futures research that studies
views on trajectories of social and environmental change in
addition to more immediate issues of governance and particular
socio-environmental impacts (Parkhill et al., 2013a), we also
examine participants’ imagined futures and longer-term concerns.
2.3. Shale development: a ‘liminal’ case in deliberation
The status of shale development in the US is considerably more
varied than in the UK. Some states have seen signiﬁcant shale
development while in others, including California, onshore
extraction from deep shale source rock is still under investigation.
Estimated future oil production rates from California’s Monterey
shale have been high, yet unreliable (Hughes, 2013; CCST, 2015)
and extraction will require technological advances to deal with
seismic-impacted geology (Beckwith, 2013; Shauk and Malik,
2014). There have also been regional calls for outright bans and
stricter state regulations approved in 2013 (Srebotnjak and Rotkin-
Ellman, 2014). While well-stimulation techniques are in use in
California, the majority of hydraulic fracturing operations are
concentrated in the San Joaquin valley away from the coastal zone
and are used almost entirely in shallower, vertical wells to access
conventional oil reservoirs CCST, 2015, pp. 11–12). However, the
experience of shale development impacts elsewhere in the US
provided important reference points for participants in both
countries. In the UK, shale extraction is not yet in commercial
production (Cotton et al., 2014). Recent UK government licensing of
land for shale development marks potential expansion into areas
with no previous history of extraction, and this has led to localized
opposition and national media ampliﬁcation (O’Hara et al., 2014).
In these changeable contexts, our cross-national approach enables
analysis of data on US and UK views gathered in workshops that
ran concurrently.
Although not part of a formal process of citizen participation,
conceptually and methodologically this research draws on ideas of
upstream public engagement: deliberation that opens up innova-
tion processes to include public knowledge and reﬂection while
policies and priorities are still being established (Wilsdon and
Willis, 2004; Stilgoe et al., 2006; Rogers-Hayden and Pidgeon,
2007; Macnaghten, 2010; Owen et al., 2013). Participants are
invited not to passively receive information but instead to discuss
open-ended questions (Corner and Pidgeon, 2012), ideally within
ongoing, relational processes of dialogue (Wynne, 2007; Chilvers
and Kearnes, 2016). In the UK, following breakdowns in engage-
ment efforts around GM crops, nanotechnologies became the test
case for upstream engagement (RS, 2004; Pidgeon and Rogers-
Hayden, 2007). This occurred before signiﬁcant research and
investment decisions had been made and thus when thosedecisions could in principle be redirected toward alternative
trajectories (Wilsdon et al., 2005).
In the US, similar approaches have been developed in public
deliberations on nanotechnologies (Pidgeon et al., 2009; Rogers-
Brown et al., 2011; Harthorn et al., 2012a), and other models for
dialogue between scientists and publics include Real-Time
Technology Assessment (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002). The up-
stream metaphor is also applied to early stages of public awareness
 where views are emergent (Rayner 2004; Satterﬁeld et al., 2009,
2012) and before technologies are widely associated with
established social representations (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden,
2007). The meaning of ‘upstream,’ however, is simultaneously
contested by some proponents who criticize its implicit linear view
of innovation, highlighting instead the dynamic, multiple ways in
which technologies and societies interact with one another in the
innovation and development process (Wilsdon et al., 2005; Rogers-
Hayden and Pidgeon, 2007).
We located our workshops in places where shale development
is still anticipated and largely unfamiliar to publics – contexts that
typically generate upstream deliberative discussion on the broader
visions, values and societal purposes of innovation and technology
(Wilsdon et al., 2005). However, in other locations, shale
development has already been implemented at scale with many
of its tangible impacts already in evidence. As such, it also invites
discussion of typically downstream issues of risk, harm, safety and
control. We suggest that shale development is thus a liminal case
for deliberation, following deﬁnitions of liminality as a domain
“betwixt and between” established categories or deﬁnitions,
where meanings about cultural objects and phenomena are
disrupted and are characterized by ambivalence (Turner, 1967).
By displaying characteristics of models of participation and
governance that might otherwise be categorized as either
anticipatory/upstream or reactive/downstream (Bosso, 2016),
and by engaging publics with issues linked to both upstream
and downstream contexts, shale development is a case unlike
those previously addressed in upstream public deliberation. In
particular, the liminality of shale development as a deliberation
subject draws attention to the varying importance of concerns
across different social and geographical locations – similarities and
variations in public responses that this research examines. This
liminal case also highlights the need for deliberative processes to
address not only what is discussed and when but also with whom
and where participation takes place.
2.4. Shale development, climate change and energy systems
In recent US Department of Energy reports, “energy systems”
have become the explicit focus of research and policy that takes a
“holistic view” of energy in interactions between the electric and
natural gas grids, manufacturing, transportation, ﬁnance, and food,
as well as water supplies, ecosystems and the global climate (DOE,
2015). Climate change in particular is implicated because shale
development has not only increased US fossil fuel production, it
has also introduced new options for the design of energy systems
around the world, raising questions about how nations might
successfully meet their own greenhouse gas reduction targets
(Ciplet et al., 2015). In this context, advocates and opponents of
shale development hold opposing views on the relationship
between US shale extraction and climate change mitigation.
Advocates in both countries argue that widespread US shale gas
extraction has generated signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts and has
reduced greenhouse gas emissions by reducing reliance on coal
(Stern et al., 2014), describing natural gas as a “bridge fuel” to meet
emission reduction goals (Levi, 2013; Sovacool, 2014). Replicating
these shifts offers the UK government one route toward meeting
short-term, legally binding carbon targets (HL-EAC, 2014).
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climate beneﬁts of natural gas from shale, given the high global
warming potential of methane – the major component of natural
gas – and widely varying estimates of methane leaks and emissions
from shale extraction processes (Brandt et al., 2014; Schneising
et al., 2014). Other studies suggest that post-2007 reductions in US
emissions were largely driven by economic recession, not by
substituting natural gas for coal in energy generation (Feng et al.,
2015). Opponents also argue that shale development exacerbates
the effects of climate change by increasing global fossil fuelFig. 1. Workshproduction and dependence (Broderick and Anderson, 2012; Stern
et al., 2014), potentially delaying both a transition to renewable
energy sources and a reduction in overall consumption (Broderick
et al., 2011; McGlade et al., 2016). Our project addresses the need
for more qualitative research on concerns that have arisen around
shale development in relation to such complex and contested
issues as climate change and energy system change (Miller et al.,
2013; Demski et al., 2015). This paper examines how public views
on these issues are formed and articulated among diverse
deliberative groups in the US and UK. We held open-endedop format.
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research methods and materials were designed accordingly.
3. Methods
We conducted four one-day deliberative workshops in cities
selected to represent two major population centers (Los Angeles;
London) and two smaller coastal cities (Santa Barbara; Cardiff)
located in areas not yet directly involved in deep shale extraction
activities and hence not expected to have experienced signiﬁcant
risk ampliﬁcation or attenuation (Pidgeon et al., 2003). The study is
based on techniques used previously by our research team leaders
to enable comparisons between public discourses on emergent
technologies in different national contexts (Harthorn et al., 2012b;
Pidgeon et al., 2009). These deliberative research contexts bring
together members of the public in conversation on topics that may
be unfamiliar, providing space to respond to new ideas and
information – a mode of qualitative inquiry deployed widely
deployed in northern Europe (Chilvers, 2010; Corner et al., 2013;
Bellamy and Lezaun, 2015) and which has made substantive
contributions to public engagement processes (Parkhill et al.,
2013b).
Ranging from 10 to 16 participants (total n = 55), each workshop
was facilitated by two researchers with two additional team-
members as assistants. The protocol was designed to provide a
progression of different ways to approach the issues (see Fig.1): (1)
free association responses to key terms; (2) a PowerPoint
presentation of uniform technical information, with Q&A; (3)
smaller group discussions of projected advantages and disadvan-
tages as described in scientiﬁc literature (Advantages: Energy
Supply; Energy Independence/Security; Energy Prices; Economy &
Jobs; Climate change; Local Beneﬁts; Disadvantages: Water Usage;
Water Quality; Earthquakes; Local Impacts; Climate change; Waste &
Byproducts); (4) responses to supportive or critical quotations; (5)
ranking proposals for different types of energy systems (in small
groups); and (6) a plenary review discussion. Our protocol and
elicitation materials are available in Appendix B: Supplementary
Material. Following the team’s prior research protocols, we also
gathered short-form Pre- and Post-workshop survey data from all
participants.
Facilitation techniques are key to such deliberative contexts.
Our research team members have extensive research experience in
focus group methods and open-ended interviewing. We aimed to
create discussions responsive to each particular group – not lead
seminars – and do so with minimal intervention, for example to
encourage full participation or in case of disruptive language or
behavior. As in other deliberative group contexts, facilitators were
equipped to counterbalance particularly critical views by providing
information on beneﬁts, or vice versa – also an efﬁcient means of
sharing information and stimulating reﬂection on how different
views had been formed (Pidgeon et al., 2014). This is an advantage
of group-based inquiry over other qualitative methods such as one-
on-one interviews – that participants have more opportunity to
lead the conversation (Gaskell, 2000) and pursue reﬂective ‘system
two’ thinking requiring time and effort (Kahneman, 2003; Kahan,
2008).
In contrast to focus group research that tends toward shorter
durations and homogeneity in group composition (Lehoux et al.,
2014), we sought diversity and created day-long discussions in a
community setting. To this end we recruited quasi-representative
(Pidgeon et al., 2009) groups to match local demographics as
closely as possible with regard to age, income, education,
occupation, and race/ethnicity, balanced gender, and drawn from
different parts of the cities. Despite these efforts, this procedure is
unable to control for unpredictable sample attrition, which did
result in higher than average levels of education in London, a groupthat was also less racially/ethnically diverse than our pre-speciﬁed
sampling quota, and somewhat skewed gender composition of two
groups (Santa Barbara and Cardiff). See Appendix A, Table 1 for a
summary of workshop demographics.
Recruitment was done through neutral third parties and was
topic-blind for discussion of “Technology and Society,” seeking a
quota sample of 12–15 as a group size suitable for focused
discussion, with further interactive conversations when divided
into ‘World Café’ type sub-groups (Pidgeon et al., 2009; Corner
et al., 2013). Some scholars question participant selection in terms
of representativeness (Flynn et al., 2009), and we note that some
potential candidates might have self-selected out (declined to
participate due to the stated workshop theme). This however
affects virtually all social research, including surveys, and it is a
requirement of ethics review committees that candidates have the
right to refuse participation at any stage. The quota was designed to
prevent skewing of group composition away from community/city
norms.
Some scholars also question whether public deliberation
groups engage a sufﬁcient number of people (Besley et al.,
2008). However, as Corner and Pidgeon (2012) argue, the range of
views represented and the opportunity for interaction are also
important. Thus while our workshop sampling could not be strictly
representative in the statistical sense, we aimed for the qualitative
equivalent (Pidgeon et al., 2014): groups including a range of
political positions and diverse worldviews, such that participants
draw on their own experiences, vulnerabilities and identities
(Conti et al., 2011). Our sampling was limited to urban areas of
different sizes. Future research could explore views of participants
living in rural settings, where some survey research has identiﬁed
differing levels of support and opposition (Davis and Fisk, 2014).
Diverse groups within our city locations were important also
because our methodology is designed explicitly to study attitudes
as they emerge organically in social interaction and is attuned both
to particular socio-political conditions (Macnaghten et al., 2015)
and cultural contexts (Felt and Fochler, 2010; Strauss et al., 2013).
Analyzing the cultural constructs people use in deliberations like
these can further be used to better inform subsequent quantitative
work (Satterﬁeld et al., 2000; Henwood et al., 2010; Pidgeon et al.,
2014; Harthorn et al., 2016).
Silverman (2007) argues that artiﬁcial research interactions
produce public views rather than identify them and are too
dependent on the materials and modes of facilitation used.
However, while facilitator effects are inescapable, we deployed
techniques to minimize them and to make them uniform across
sites where they might occur. We conducted multiple pilot
workshops (two in Cardiff; one in Santa Barbara) to standardize
facilitation and assess effects of the protocol – developing a cross-
culturally valid protocol used across all sites, with minor variations
tailored to localized information on licensing and drilling activity.
Based on current peer-reviewed scientiﬁc research and in
consultation with a panel of ﬁve experts in both countries,
materials were created by our research team – avoiding use of
more accessible, often inﬂammatory, accounts found in the public
domain. We sought a neutral effect of materials by providing a
range of information and views and allowing participants to freely
select among them. There remains some framing of the issues, of
course, and our frames followed from prior research on nano-
technologies and energy issues, including: risk and beneﬁt
perception in the face of technological change; energy systems;
and responsible governance. The term ‘energy futures’ was absent
from our workshop materials and discussions. Although partic-
ipants were not speciﬁcally prompted to think about long-term
futures, concerns of this kind were particularly widespread.
With participants’ consent, audio and video recordings were
made of all workshops, then transcribed using professional
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expressed views of participants and following established prac-
tices of analyzing qualitative data (Urquhart, 2013), our analysis
was thematic and iterative. Through processes of reading and
coding, we examined transcripts for the most salient themes.
Initial observations were further analyzed in discussion among all
research team-members. The resulting extensive data set covered a
broad range of themes. Addressing the project objectives of
studying shale development in the context of energy system
change, here we focus on participants’ longer-term views and
perspectives, speciﬁcally dealing with diverse views on climate
change, fossil fuels, and questions of responsibility.
4. Results
4.1. Looking ahead: participant views on climate change, fossil fuels
and future generations
Observations from initial workshop discussions provide context
for subsequent ﬁndings: extensive concern for sustainability and
environmental care, and very little skepticism about whether
climate change is happening and is human-caused. Each workshop
began by ﬁelding free association responses to a series of words
and themes, including “Climate Change.” In Santa Barbara,
participants linked their personal experiences of changing weather
conditions to the idea that climate change is real, present and
related to a collective need “to live sustainably” (Olivia, Santa
Barbara [SB]). These initial responses drew attention to a key
contextual feature: a severe drought of several years’ duration in
California was ongoing at the time. In Los Angeles, immediate
responses included terms such as “drastic,” “unpredictable” and
“dangerous,” and some people also elaborated on personal
experience, e.g., “in California we don’t have seasons anymore 
we just stay hot” (Frank, Los Angeles [LA]). Evidence from the US
shows climate change views aligning with increasing ideological
polarization (Stern and Kasperson, 2010), so we might have
expected to encounter more climate skepticism. However, our
groups closely matched California city demographics – Los
Angeles, 5/10/1 (Republican/Democrat/None stated) and Santa
Barbara, 3/7/5 – and yet just one participant in each of the
Californian workshops voiced climate skepticism. We also
maintain that political views intersect with many other factors
(among them: gender, race, class, education) and, as such,
participants speak from multiple identity positions (Alcoff,
2006; Barvosa, 2008).
In Cardiff (CF), terms volunteered in responses to “Climate
Change” included extinction, pollution, fragility, as well as reference
to both the effects and causes of climate change, including “rising
sea level” and “use of fossil fuels.” Again, a minority position voiced
by only one person in Cardiff suggested that human inﬂuence on
the climate was less signiﬁcant than is claimed. Views in London
were generally emphatic about concern for the environment, with
no one speaking out against the reality and presence of
anthropogenic climate change, e.g., “We’ve already got dangerous
climate change, haven’t we?” (Marion, London [LN]). Sanvi made
explicit links between energy systems and future impacts: “it’s like
environmental change, energy, it depends how we use those is going to
affect the climate change in the future” (Sanvi, LN).
Moving on to other segments of the workshop, in the UK, and
particularly in our London group, many people voiced support for
the national energy system to shift toward renewable sources –
emphasizing how fossil fuels are ultimately ﬁnite and thus
unsuitable as a basis for future energy systems: “we’ve only got
enough non-renewables or fossil fuels or whatever, to last us a certain
amount of years. So does humanity only intend to survive for another
thousand years?” (Bea, LN). A preferred vision was to reduce currentdependency on fossil fuels – which for some was a form of
“addiction” (Paul, LN) – given their ﬁnitude: “it’s about cutting down
our dependence on something that’s unreliable” (Lois, LN).
In our US workshops, similar ideas about past and present
energy policy decisions as being suboptimal were articulated with
less direct reference to the unsustainability of fossil fuels and
slightly more emphasis on broader consequences of energy use
and environmental interactions. For example, Joyce (SB) intro-
duced the idea of humans ideally positioned as “stewards” of the
natural world, and suggested we have collectively failed to live up
to this ideal: “Everybody needs to do their part . . . I mean we’re
beyond fortunate with our resources, and we have not been very good
stewards of how we use them” (Joyce, SB).
Also in our California workshops, people described both
pervasive dependency on fossil fuels in their everyday lives, and
the necessity of moving away from such dependency. Participants’
written comments included, “renewable sources are an ultimate
goal,” and “we need to move away from poisoning our precious
environment.” Such moves were seen as not only necessary, but
also possible, given the perceived wealth of technological
resources available: “If the United States is so technically advanced .
. . we ought to look for other ways to, you know, become less
dependent on oil” (Susan, SB).
In both countries, future generations were mentioned explicitly
in descriptions of anticipated negative consequences of contem-
porary actions. In London, Lois felt that any beneﬁts today from
fossil fuel extraction would “screw the future generations or other
countries or even people in my country now but who aren’t me” (Lois,
LN) – sentiments echoed in Santa Barbara: “we’re kind of screwing
up collectively the world for the next generation” (Joel, SB). Martha
(LA) more than once expanded the scope of the conversation to
include “next generations,” and Ray (SB) imagined being held
directly accountable: “We’re making decisions that are going to
affect the planet from now on . . . what are we going to say to the
next generations who follow us? We needed the money that bad?”
(Ray, SB). For some, a perceived prioritization of the short-term by
government and industry reﬂected preoccupation with the
immediate more generally, e.g. “people don’t see the strategic
issues, they only see what’s in front of their eyes, most people”
(Dennis, CF). This tension between timescales led many to re-
assess notions of ‘progress’ (see Section 4.2, below) and to question
the longer-term role of shale development in energy systems.
4.2. “Too little, too late” or “like a step backwards”
Facilitators and workshop materials presented expert assess-
ments of climate change as linked to both advantages and
disadvantages of shale development. The posters and related
information sheets (see Appendix B) were the main tools in
initiating these discussions, and in responding to subsequent
questions regarding these two apparently contradictory positions.
Materials included the statement that burning natural gas
produces lower levels of carbon dioxide emissions than coal
(per unit of electricity generated) and that this reduction could
reduce effects of climate change. However, in all workshops we
encountered doubt regarding these projected beneﬁts. For
example, Isabel in Santa Barbara said:
“I feel like fracking is not really going to have a huge effect on
climate change at this point . . . the only way we’re going to
minimize [or] reverse climate change is by going to renewable
fuels. So I see it as maybe a small step, but I think that we need
to make a much bigger step” (Isabel, SB)
Many participants linked climate change effects to the ongoing
use of fossil fuels, something they felt urgently needed to be
reduced. For example, Andrew in London said that lowering
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little, too late”: “Reducing emissions, I believe, is now too small a step,
too late on. Ideally, we want to be cutting them entirely” (Andrew,
LN). Other participants also thought such objectives would be
impeded by reduced investment in renewable energy – a potential,
indirect consequence of governmental support for shale develop-
ment: “the longer you rely on [what] you’re used to, which are fossil
fuels, that kind of [renewable] technology isn’t going to be
developed” (Laurel, CF). The sense of energy projects competing for
ﬁnite ﬁnancial resources in government and science/technology
spheres was also expressed in our US workshops, for example
when discussing the recent economic failure of a large solar plant
in California: “certainly the technology [is] there. It’s [just] not
subsidized and doesn't have the support that oil and gas has had for
years” (Joyce, SB).
Many participants feared current changes to energy systems
were insufﬁciently forward-looking. Shale development was seen
as operating on relatively short timescales while renewable energy
sources were more enduring. The prioritization of short-term goals
by government and industry called some to question whether shale
development represented societal progress or not:
“I ﬁnd it really depressing that they won’t invest in green energy.
And the main argument is that it’s expensive but there’s no way
that this [shale development] is cheap, and it is such a short-
term solution” (Lois, LN)
The perceived short-termism of support for shale development
was also critiqued in Cardiff. Jess said that it “almost feels like a step
backwards” and added: “[shale development’s] obviously not
renewable. It’s only going to last for a certain amount of
time . . . they could be developing wind power, solar power . . .
rather than trying to look for a quick ﬁx all the time” (Jess, CF).
In subtle contrast to this, US participants raised questions about
how the story of shale had been relayed in repeated TV ads and
other media. typically exaggerating the merits and obscuring the
negative environmental impacts of “clean” natural gas, without
comparison to the cleanest (renewable) energy sources:
“this big impetus toward natural gas . . . I’m curious about [how]
that information was brought forth to the public about how
benign and beneﬁcial natural gas was. And it’s really easy when
you compare it to coal because coal is ugly and messy . . . ”
(Miriam, SB)
We also encountered doubts in both countries about the
trustworthiness of publicly available scientiﬁc information on
shale development, and concerns that critical information was
being withheld. Information might have been “manipulated” for
public consumption, in order to achieve certain political ends:
“Often we are very much deceived, or there’s a bit of massaging facts
and ﬁgures” (Karen, CF). Others suggested that elected represen-
tatives and other ofﬁcials – glossed as “they” – might deliberately
conceal pertinent information in order to avoid opposition: “they
don’t really want us to be, you know, aware of these things because
then we’re going to question it” (Sally, LA). In addition to issues of
trust, these views raised a number of ethical issues concerning
different kinds and degrees of responsibility.
4.3. Institutional and individual responsibilities for energy system
change
Responsibility for changing energy systems in line with people’s
desired futures was seen as being differentially distributed among
government institutions, industry, and individuals. In both
countries, participants expressed concern about what were seen
as short-term objectives and the apparent complicity between
government and industry driving these. Some expressed unease atthe apparent “rush to frack” in UK energy policy and at the social
and environmental costs of meeting economic imperatives: “there
is a real danger that it’s just a dash for cash . . . people are being asked
to sort of give up land rights [for] corporate proﬁt” (Paul, LN).
In the US workshops, participants also expressed concerns about
driving factors behind energy policy decisions, suggesting that fossil
fuel industry pressure – and actions of “lobbyists” in particular – had
led to a lack of political support for renewable initiatives. Such
inﬂuences were seen as having a negative impact on technological
change in general, and on the move toward non-carbon energy
sources in particular, since energy policy was responsive primarily
to economic interests: “I think of the money in politics and who proﬁts
the most from our dependency on oil” (Joel, SB).
The strength of unwarranted corporate inﬂuence on energy
system change was described in both countries. In London and
Cardiff, the economic interests of oil and “the big six” energy
companies were thought to be protected at the cost of consumers,
and their interests prioritized in energy policy: “it’s controlled by
the BPs and the Shells of the world . . . if there was no proﬁt in it,
they wouldn’t bother” (Bryn, CF). In Santa Barbara, the inﬂuence of
corporations more generally was seen as limiting government
support for clean energy:
“the government . . . basically just represents the corporations
and what they want to do . . . No one says, ‘Well, this is what the
government should do: let’s make the energy that we need for the
future now”' (Ray, SB).
As in other new technology deliberations, however, there were
persistent tensions between different ways of assuming, or
attributing, responsibility. Amid widespread criticism of govern-
ments and energy corporations, people also reﬂected self-critically
on their individual responsibilities and the effects of their own (in)
actions. This included political responsibility and the perceived
need for citizens to hold governments and corporations to account:
“I think if people were truly not apathetic . . . companies [would]
make sure that nothing bad would happen” (Eric, LA). In London, Lois
summarized these tensions between systemic/policy and individ-
ual/consumption responsibilities:
“we can’t just say to the government, well you need to be making
green energy and you need to be producing enough for us to
continue life as we have it now” (Lois, LN).
Individual responsibility was most frequently articulated in this
register, describing patterns of consumption as being in excess of
what is desirable or sustainable: “we’re not stopping from buying .
. . we’re still buying” (Natalie, LA). However, appeals to the
necessity of maintaining current levels of energy demand were
questioned and viewed with some skepticism, highlighting instead
the need to address actual levels of energy consumption, for
example:
“It’s a massive issue [of] moral sustainability . . . We seem to be
not looking for ways to control our expenditures . . . We’re just
looking for new energy sources” (Bea, LN).
In Los Angeles, high sustained levels of consumption – of
everyday and luxury products and, by extension, of fossil fuels that
power their manufacture and distribution – were linked to changes
in weather patterns. For some, these impacts were seen as the result
of “taking out” excessive amounts of resources from the Earth:
“It kind of makes sense where our climate is weird because we’re
using more than we need. If [we] really just took out and not used
more than we had to, then we wouldn’t have this climate change,
drastic, right?” (Sally, LA),
“Right” (Peter, LA).
Others questioned the idea of individual choice as the critical
dimension and highlighted how individual actions are shaped by
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in the US, everyday dependency on fossil fuels and their products
was seen as unavoidable, where for example people have
witnessed food prices rise in line with gasoline price increases.
At the same time, lack of alternatives was seen as further limiting
individual capacity to reduce fossil fuel use: “If we really had a
choice about driving, if we had really good public transportation [and]
safe ways to ride bicycles, it would be a no-brainer to use less fuel, less
oil” (Miriam, SB). Many participants in both countries thus felt they
were directly, and differentially, implicated in political and
economic processes they felt should be changed.
5. Discussion
Participants across all of our workshops critiqued arguments
made in favor of shale development in terms of a perceived short-
termism – the privileging of short-term interests over consider-
ation of temporally distant consequences (Groves, 2014). In energy
debates, such short-termism is evident in the assumption that
addressing pollution or climate change can be deferred while more
expedient or proﬁtable policies are pursued with minimal
disruption to current practices (Nixon, 2011). Since longer-term
impacts were a real source of concern for most of our participants
(due to environmental risks, and the widely-shared view that shale
extraction would exacerbate climate change), shale development
was not seen as real “progress” in the modiﬁcation of energy
systems. Such future-oriented views are in direct contrast to those
of publics characterized by “future blindness” (Lorenzoni et al.,
2007) or preoccupation with immediate priorities at the expense
of longer-term or global concerns (Moser and Dilling, 2004).
Dryzek et al. (2009) argue there are structural reasons why
deliberating publics in North America and Europe tend toward
precaution and longer-term concerns while policy-makers tend
toward expeditious support for technological innovation: policy-
makers believe they are subject to short-term competitive
imperatives, whereas ‘lay publics’ deduce risks underlie delibera-
tive consultation and are thus inclined to express concern.
However, these traits are neither uniform nor predictable:
deliberative research on different technologies has variously found
beneﬁt-centricity, risk-centricity, precaution and techno-opti-
mism (Marris, 2001; Walls et al., 2005; Bickerstaff et al., 2008;
Pidgeon et al., 2009).
For those who saw it as incompatible with their broader visions
for energy system change, shale development in both countries
was what the Understanding Risk Group at Cardiff University have
described, based upon a UK study, as a “non-transition” – not
matching ideas of improvement or progress (Parkhill et al., 2013a;
Demski et al., 2015). Many of our participants described shale
development in these terms, in part because shale development
was seen as doing little to address pervasive, everyday reliance on
fossil fuels – something that participants across all four workshops
felt should be changed but were unsure of their individual ability to
effect.
Here the concept of energy futures (the potential design and
conﬁguration of energy systems in the future) is useful in
interpreting participant views on competing energy choices and
ideas about the future (Demski et al., 2015). Studies on inevitability
have found that when people feel trapped by inescapable systems,
they place less blame on systemic processes for situations of
inequality, and articulate lower support for policies that seek to
resolve those inequalities (Kay and Zanna, 2009). However, even
though in our workshops current energy systems were widely seen
as inescapable, this did not weaken the belief that those systems
can, and should, be changed in the direction of more renewable
energy sources. Blame for creating perceived barriers to these
changes was typically apportioned not to one-off instances ofcorruption or recreancy but to failure at a more systemic level
(Freudenburg, 2001; Macnaghten and Guivant, 2011). Most
participants admitted their own culpability as consumers of
energy while also suggesting that proposed changes would require
governmental support. In this sense, views on energy futures
addressed both the demand and supply side of energy system
change (Parkhill et al., 2013a). To the extent that shale develop-
ment was thought likely to be at the opportunity cost of further
renewable technology research and investment, it was largely seen
as contributing to a narrowing of alternatives, creating undesirable
energy futures.
The sense that current US/UK energy systems are inescapable
has consequences for how attitudes and actions on climate change
are interpreted. Frequently, studies look for evidence of belief
change in examples of behavior change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007;
Rabinovich et al., 2010). However, as many of our participants
articulated, failing to adopt more climate-friendly actions reﬂects
not only individual agency and belief; it also reﬂects ‘social
barriers’ such as a relative absence of alternatives that people can
incorporate into their lives (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Despite such a
perceived lack of ‘shared responsibility’ that no one individual can
fully overcome (Bickerstaff et al., 2006, Lorenzoni and Hulme 2009
), doubt among our participants about the efﬁcacy of action taken
to address climate change – what Capstick and Pidgeon (2014) call
response skepticism – did not result in a lack of concern about
climate change and instead in renewed calls for more forward-
looking energy systems. Almost all participants agreed that climate
change was real and its effects already being felt – often based on
personal experience – suggesting reduced perceptions of geo-
graphical, temporal or social distance from the impacts of climate
change (cf. Spence et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2015). In
considering the causes of climate change, any sense of distance
was reduced even further: people were aware of their implication
in energy systems that adversely affect the climate, and described
the lack of political will to change these in negative terms.
In these discussions, participants recognized that not everyone
is equally responsible or inﬂuential in facilitating desired changes
such as the transition to renewable energy sources (Pidgeon, 2012).
On this theme of responsibility, we found subtle cross-national
differences that replicated those in previous comparative US-UK
research on nanotechnologies (Pidgeon et al., 2009). While
government and industry operators were widely criticized in both
countries, we encountered more direct criticism of the UK
government, in this case for failing in its responsibility to source
energy in less environmentally damaging ways – in a country
where the image of a singular, national energy system controlled
by central government is more readily applicable (Pidgeon et al.,
2014). In the US, such critiques focused slightly more on
corporations and their undue ability to inﬂuence policy-makers.
The distinctions drawn between individual and institutional
responsibilities also affected issues of trust. Adam and Groves
(2007) note that responsibility (as liability, or as blame) depends
on knowledge. Those proposing technological change who possess
knowledge – of different impacts, the potential for harm, and that
some actions are higher risk than others – are likely to be held most
accountable (Owen et al., 2013). Without such knowledge, direct
responsibility may be signiﬁcantly reduced (Adam and Groves,
2007). In our workshops, most participants felt that shale
development would lead to environmental damage and would
not result in a reduction in fossil fuel use. A result of this was
distrust of governments and energy corporations supportive of
shale development who were assumed to have knowledge of these
potentially harmful impacts and their association with some
energy choices more than others.
Ofﬁcials in the UK – including then prime minister David
Cameron – have echoed government rhetoric in prior risk
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development there is based on a “lack of understanding”
(Dominiczak, 2014). Many of our participants took issue with this
view and suggested instead that the apparent “rush to frack”
reﬂects an institutional downplaying of uncertainty and a failure
by government(s) to recognize that a lot of resistance to shale
development is driven instead by the broader and future-oriented
concerns reported above. The issue here is that deﬁnitive, ofﬁcial
positions leave no space for other perspectives (Wynne, 1992) and
reject people’s abilities to place issues in social context and to
evaluate them by the extent to which they threaten or support
identities and visions for the future (Henwood and Pidgeon, 2013;
Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014; Shirani et al., 2016).
Our ﬁndings show that beneﬁt-centric government and industry
discourse has added to public concerns. In the US, no-risk messaging
in media campaigns around shale development and ‘overselling’ of
the beneﬁts of natural gas had caused people to question these
claims. The UK government’s explicit support for shale had similarly
raisedsuspicions regarding information thatmightbewithheld from
public scrutiny. As in other studies on energy system change, this
institutional ‘body language’ (Wynne, 1996) – apparent discrep-
ancies inpolicyand rhetoric – led participants to furtherquestion the
trustworthiness of information (Butler et al., 2013). The responses
we have documented alignwith ﬁndings from research on other new
technologies where emergent responses are inﬂuenced by ideas
about who stands to proﬁt, who is responsible for decision-making
(Schütz and Wiedemann, 2008), and perceptions of fairness and
trust (Satterﬁeld et al., 2012).
Finally, some scholars suggest that publics favor renewable
energy sources because the importance of climate change can
‘crowd out’ space for considering other consequences of emerging
energy technologies (Davies and Selin, 2012). However, in our
workshops, climate change concerns were not the only frame in
which participants articulated the “incompatibility” between shale
development and desired energy futures. As we have seen, other
concerns included environmental impacts of various kinds
(including risks of water contamination and increased seismic
activity) as well as systemic issues such as the need to address
energy consumption and the risk of reducing investment in
renewable energy.
While we encountered engagement with these broad-scale
issues in both countries, some cross-national differences emerged
reﬂecting different national contexts and stages of shale industry
development. Most oil and gas extraction in the UK to date has
occurred offshore (Mair et al., 2012) while some areas of the US
have seen extensive shale development and California itself has a
long history of conventional oil extraction (CCST, 2015). More in
the UK than US workshops, conversations explicitly addressed the
“unsustainability” of fossil fuels, whereas in California the
previously-witnessed impacts of extractive industries – both in
state and beyond – apparently inﬂuenced different concerns such
as the industrialization of rural areas affecting valued landscapes
(in Santa Barbara) or of populated areas affecting human health (in
Los Angeles), even among groups who were largely unfamiliar with
shale development itself. Future public deliberation research could
comparatively explore concerns in areas where shale development
is currently active and its impacts already directly experienced.
6. Conclusion
The design, diversity and duration of our deliberation work-
shops enabled participants in two countries to explore a range of
concerns that tend not to be addressed in survey-based research or
short-form qualitative inquiry. While deliberative modes of
qualitative inquiry are used increasingly in some parts of the
world, particularly northern Europe, a key contribution of thisstudy is to continue to extend this method of inquiry in the US.
Furthering these research techniques, we have also reﬂected on
how shale development as a liminal subject for deliberation draws
attention to differences and similarities in views across different
temporal, social and geographical locations (cf. also (Bickerstaff
and Simmons, 2009)). This liminal case underlines the importance
of also addressing with whom and where deliberative participation
takes place in addition to what is discussed and when. Our analysis
also highlights the need for further conceptual and empirical work
on liminal spaces and objects in relation to engaging the public
about novel risks.
Our whole-day deliberations were responsive to particular
group dynamics, and opened up discussion to particular risks and
beneﬁts as well as broader multi-scale issues such as climate
change and responsibility. We have identiﬁed critical similarities
between diverse groups in the importance they place on concerns
about the long-term future when assessing a range of projected
impacts of shale development – challenging characterizations of
public views as being ‘future blind.’
Analyzing participant ideas about how shale development
might undermine or reinforce the energy systems they consider
necessary or desirable for the future – views on energy futures – this
article has documented surprisingly strong and prevalent concerns
around common themes. Many US and UK participants saw shale
development as intrinsically incompatible with their desired
energy futures, and articulated doubt in claims that shale
development will have a positive impact on climate change. This
was in groups characterized overall by acceptance of the reality
and immediacy of anthropogenic climate change. Most partic-
ipants across all four sites saw shale development as deepening,
not transitioning away from, energy infrastructures that depend on
fossil fuels  energy systems seen as simultaneously inescapable
and in need of change. While grappling with these contradictions,
most participants recognized that achieving desired energy futures
requires both individual and institutional action. Support for and
investment in shale development was seen as displacing more
desirable alternatives – reducing the likelihood that renewable
energy sources will be developed and adopted – amplifying
concern about a perceived short-termism in energy debates and
government-industry complicity in these processes.
These ﬁndings show that emergent views on shale development
involve not only concerns about immediate social and environmen-
tal impacts – the focus of much prior social research, and of
institutional assurances of its relative safety – but also concerns
about the value and viability of different long-term energy futures
and their sustainability. The views we have analyzed also reveal a
remarkably widespread and deep commitment to making necessary
changes in the present in order to secure a livable future.
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City Los Angeles Santa Barbara London Cardiff
Number of participants 16 15 10 14
Gender (female%) 50 67 50 71
Age proﬁle (%) 18–34 44 27 40 43
35–54 38 27 30 21
55+ 19 46 30 28 (7)
Ethnicity (non-white%) 75 53 30 7 (7)
Education
(university degree or above%)
31 53 70 57 (7)
Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding effects; withheld responses are
shown in parentheses.
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Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2016.11.002.
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